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n spite of the formal role laid out for the General Affairs Council (GAC) in the Treaties, it has been 
weakened since it was extracted from the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) 
and set up to function on its own. Its current uneven composition is leading to further 
marginalisation. Reforming the GAC can bring it to the centre of gravity of the Council proceedings 
and address a number of problems in the current institutional structure. For that to happen, however, 
countries holding the rotating Council presidency need to consider placing their head of state or 
government in the chair of the GAC meetings. Upgrading GAC in this way would streamline the 
diverse work of the Council, it would help in alleviating the heavy political burden that now falls on the 
understaffed President of the European Council and it would allow the institution of the rotating 
presidency to regain a higher political profile by creating out of national leaders a de facto Vice 
President of the European Council. 
 
The General Affairs Council (GAC) is one of only 
two Council formations with a basis in the 
Treaties. Despite this formal treaty importance 
and its historically significant role as a part-
descendant of the General Affairs and External 
Relations Council (GAERC), it has become 
substantially weakened since the Treaty of Lisbon 
came into force in December 2009. This apparent 
paradox raises the question whether the GAC 
should be empowered to act as the coordinating 
nexus for the Council as envisaged by the 
Treaties, and if so, how? 
The Treaty of Lisbon broke a longstanding chain 
of command operating in the Council, in which 
the entire process was in the hands of the rotating 
presidency. With all its deficiencies, the system 
worked after many years of settling in. The 
Lisbon system vitiated the rotating presidency 
with the arrival of the permanent chair of the 
European Council meetings. For the  system to 
work properly, close cooperation between the 
Council and the European Council is essential, 
but this cooperation must respect each of the 
institutions’ distinctive prerogatives. In principle, 
the General Affairs Council would occupy the 
central position for this is where the two parallel 
systems of governance should meet: the top-down 
model in which issues are delegated from the 
European Council and the bottom-up model in 
which issues are uploaded from sectoral Council 
formations. Until now, however, the reality has been 
different. 
From GAERC to GAC 
Before the Lisbon Treaty entered into force, the 
General Affairs and External Relations Council 
had a strong pedigree as the beating heart of EU 
coordination.  Under pre-Lisbon rules, the 
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GAERC was in reality the central EU forum for 
decision-making, and the key actors were the 
Foreign  Ministers, who participated in the 
meetings of the GAERC and the European 
Council.  
The Treaty of Lisbon split GAERC into two 
Council formations: the Foreign Affairs Council 
(FAC), chaired by the High Representative of the 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 
and the General Affairs Council (GAC), chaired 
by the rotating Council presidencies. 
In the old system, Foreign Ministers, in general 
terms, held greater prestige in the ministerial 
ranks than they do today. In GAERC they dealt 
with the Common Foreign and Security Policy, 
but also the horizontal coordination of other 
Council formations and the preparations for the 
European Council. 
Since December 2009, two major structural factors 
introduced by the Lisbon Treaty have 
undermined the new GAC’s importance: 
•  Firstly, the command structure was broken 
between the President of the European 
Council and the rotating presidency, and  
•  Secondly, foreign ministers have shifted their 
attention to the FAC and no new set of 
ministers has been assigned responsibility for 
coordinating the national EU positions. This 
has left a vacuum. 
 
GAC’s Function 
The GAC’s functions are two-fold according to 
the treaties. Firstly it is charged with the crucial 
task of coordinating the other Council formations. 
Where cross-policy or multi-policy issues arise 
(for instance, issues concerning both 
telecommunications and competition, or between 
environment and ECOFIN) as discussion points 
(so-called ‘B items’ in EU jargon), the GAC is the 
designated actor to address them. The same is 
true for general horizontal issues – budgets, 
multiannual financial frameworks (MAFF), 
enlargement, etc. In practice, however, the GAC 
has been struggling to fulfil this cross-policy 
coordination role. These issues currently proceed 
to the European Council at the discretion of the 
President of the European Council (POTEC), with 
little or no input at the GAC level.1 
Secondly, the GAC is responsible for the 
preparation and follow-up of the European 
Council, in liaison with the POTEC (Art. 16.6, 
TEU). On paper, this body’s role in preparing the 
work of an ascendant European Council and in 
coordinating over a dozen policy areas makes it a 
central actor in EU policy-making (see 
diagramme in the Annex). Yet in practice, its 
importance and effectiveness have withered. 
The post-Lisbon rotating presidency 
One major critique of the new EU governance 
architecture relates to the break in command 
between the European Council and the rotating 
presidency since the position of President of the 
European Council (POTEC) was created. 
Previously the head of state or government of the 
member state holding the rotating presidency 
could effectively coordinate cross-policy matters 
by directly managing his or her ministers as they 
chaired other Council formations. In this 
arrangement, the minister chairing GAERC 
played a key deputising and horizontal role for 
their head of state or government in the European 
Council. The new permanent POTEC cannot exert 
the same prime ministerial authority over the 
chairs of other Council formations, as these actors 
are still drawn from the six-month rotating 
presidency (with the exception of the FAC). 
Moreover the national Foreign Ministers, who 
traditionally covered general EU affairs within 
GAERC, attended the European Council meetings 
in the previous system, allowing for greater 
continuity of work. Since early 2010, however, 
they no longer assist their head of state or 
government in those meetings and they rarely 
attend the GAC, as we show below. These 
developments present a challenge in trying to 
bring about a coordinated management across 
diffuse policy areas, which is where the GAC 
would ideally weigh in.  
Relative ministerial prestige and egos matter 
when it comes to choosing an actor who can 
effectively coordinate his/her ministerial peers. 
                                                      
1 The treaties as amended by Lisbon (Art. 15.6(b) TEU) 
provide that input into the European Council agendas 
comes from the POTEC, the President of the Commission 
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Apart from the head of government, foreign 
ministers provided horizontal coordination in the 
old system. Yet those days when the GAERC 
chair would corral his ministerial peers across 
different Council formations are now gone, as the 
position of foreign minister has slipped down the 
ministerial pecking order. 
To make matters worse, due to their primary 
focus on CFSP matters at the FAC, Foreign 
Ministers now often delegate participation in the 
GAC to their deputies, state secretaries for 
European affairs, or even their permanent 
representatives. It is questionable whether a body 
composed of these more junior actors can be 
effective at coordinating cross-cutting, horizontal 
policy initiatives.  
Diminished participation 
Our survey of attendance in the GAC over the 
period January 2010-June 2011, as depicted in 
Figure 1, reveals clear evidence of declining 
participation. For instance, only four member 
states sent a minister (either foreign minister, 
deputy foreign or state secretary) to every GAC 
meeting. In the same period, 15% of all 
representatives held no ministerial rank at all. In 
one GAC meeting in May 2010, only one-half of 
the participants were ministers of any rank. 
Further analysis of the participation in the GAC 
meetings shows that this Council formation is not 
evenly attended. Between January 2010 and June 
2011, foreign ministers attended only 50% of the 
meetings, while the junior ministers were present 
at 35%. In 15% of the cases, representation was 
provided by the permanent representatives. Only 
four states were represented by a cabinet-level 
minister on more than 75% of the occasions; and 
only one country – Hungary – was represented 
by a foreign minister at all GAC meetings. In nine 
other cases, the GAC meetings were attended by 
a Europe minister (state secretary level) on more 
than 50% of the occasions.  
Also, this fluctuating attendance significantly 
reduces the potential for continuity of the 
Council’s work, as different persons follow the 
agenda from one meeting to the next. This leaves 
little room for increased levels of trust to develop 
among the various participants. 
Figure 1. Participation in the GAC meetings by the highest rank position, January 2010-June 2011 
 
 
Therefore, it appears even more problematic for 
this body – with its heterogeneous and often low-
ranking membership – to be responsible for 
coordinating policy initiatives falling across 
several Council formations. Put simply: most of 
the other formations that the GAC would seek to 
coordinate are made up of more senior ministers. 
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As to whether the GAC can fulfil its second 
responsibility, namely preparing the work of the 
European Council, there are certainly areas where 
the POTEC would benefit from effective support 
from the GAC. But the GAC risks not being taken 
seriously in this effort if it does not reform its 
membership and streamline its work. 
How to reform the GAC? 
Without upgrading the GAC, coordination efforts 
will shift more decisively to other forums, such as 
COREPER (the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives), or direct coordination will be 
performed by the POTEC. In principle, these two 
actors may effectively fill the coordination 
vacuum, but this development raises concerns of 
democratic legitimacy and accountability, and 
would not appear to be in line with the spirit or 
letter of the treaties. Additionally, it would also 
further limit the political importance of the 
rotating presidencies and put enormous pressure 
on the very small POTEC team. In short, both the 
President of the European Council and the 
rotating presidency need a strengthened GAC. 
The alternative is for policy-makers to reform the 
GAC by channelling its attention towards the 
important political questions of the day and by 
strengthening the composition of the body to 
employ its competences as envisaged by the 
treaty. Reforming the GAC would help to repair 
the missing link between the POTEC staff and the 
European Council and between the Council 
General Secretariat and the various Council 
formations of the rotating presidency.  
The GAC’s first opportunity comes with the 
imminent negotiation of the next MAFF while 
other important topics are being addressed 
elsewhere (e.g. enlargement to Western Balkans, 
asylum, staff regulation or the reform of the 
Court of Justice).2 MAFF presents the Council 
formation with an opportunity to demonstrate its 
                                                      
2 There are 19 working parties and groups under GAC, 
ranging from the High-Level Working Group on Asylum 
and Migration and Horizontal Working Party on Drugs 
to entities dealing with such highly diverse issues as 
outermost regions, atomic questions, statistics, 
Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) for 
Bulgaria and Romania, enlargement and the situation in 
Cyprus (see List of Council preparatory bodies, 
56881/1/11 Rev 1, Council of the European Union, 1 
February 2011, Brussels). 
relevance by initiating substantial talks on all 
MAFF-related issues (i.e. the EU’s own resources) 
before it proceeds to discussion at the European 
Council. The GAC can be effective when it acts as 
a sounding-board for member-state positions, 
identifying roadmaps (and roadblocks). The 
MAFF negotiations will allow the GAC to put 
these strengths into action and reduce the burden 
on the European Council. 
Secondly, a key factor constraining the GAC’s 
effectiveness as a coordinating actor is its varying 
and low-level composition. In most member 
states, the only minister with sufficient horizontal 
authority to coordinate his/her ministerial 
colleagues in other Council formations is the head 
of state or government.3 Rotating presidencies 
should have the opportunity for their prime 
minister or president to assume the chair of the 
GAC. In addition to facilitating better 
coordination of cross-sectoral initiatives, and 
assisting the POTEC, this innovation would raise 
the authority of the body and also provide a task 
for the rotating presidency’s PM, who is currently 
left with little to do aside from addressing the 
European Parliament. 
In cases where the GAC would be presided over 
by a head of state or government of the country 
holding the rotating presidency, other member 
states should send a sitting minister with a 
mandate from his head of state or government to 
address the relevant horizontal issue. Indeed, 
some countries may wish to send their deputy 
prime minister, or even their prime minister. The 
incentive for all member states to upgrade their 
participation would undoubtedly lead to a more 
powerful GAC, with a high-profile chair and 
better equipped to fulfil the tasks envisaged for it 
by the treaties. 
Challenges 
This is not to say that such an approach would 
not present problems. Some might argue that in 
coalition governments, senior coalition partners 
would have difficulty with the junior partner 
coordinating horizontal policy areas (for instance, 
if the UK’s Deputy PM from the Liberal 
Democrats was to chair the GAC). However, that 
                                                      
3 Excepting semi-presidential systems such as France, 
Romania, Finland and Lithuania, where both the heads of 
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concern applies equally to the European Council 
for the junior party – presumably unrepresented 
at head of state or government level. The issue of 
engendering trust within a government in their 
representatives on different Councils is one that 
can and should be addressed between governing 
parties on a national level. 
An important element in the system would be 
that the head of national government as a GAC 
chair would act de facto as Vice President of the 
European Council. There are two reasons for this 
perspective. First, he or she would be the only 
person who would simultaneously sit on both 
Councils (that is, unless other European Council 
members decided to take part in GAC meetings), 
giving this political figure a comparative 
advantage with issues addressed at the highest 
EU political level. Second, he or she would have 
major input into what is (and is not) on the 
European Council agendas. In total, this would 
also foster cooperation between the European 
Council and the sectoral Council formations, 
since the GAC is envisaged by the treaties to act 
as a supporting body to the European Council 
and a facilitator for cross-Council policy 
initiatives. It should be understood that by 
chairing the GAC, the PM of the rotating 
presidency is rendering a service to the 
institutions – albeit one wielding considerable 
influence. 
Another challenge is to ensure for the PM of the 
rotating presidency that the representation 
around the table is adequate. In other words, for 
the PM to chair the GAC, the rotating presidency 
needs to ensure that the interlocutors from other 
member states are at a commensurate level. There 
is always a risk that a PM would in fact chair a 
unimportant working meeting of junior Europe 
ministers or national sherpas on EU affairs (or, 
the opposite challenge would be if GAC would de 
facto became an alternative setting to the 
European Council, but with legislative powers 
and under the leadership of the rotating 
presidency). This would clearly be unsustainable. 
However, all member states should see the 
upgrade of the GAC as an opportunity for their 
own PM to potentially play an important role 
during their rotating presidency. This in itself 
should motivate general high-level participation 
in the body. 
Conclusions: The GAC and the 
European Council  
A GAC led by a more effective chair who can 
steer his colleagues in their capacity as chairs of 
other Council formations would lead to more 
positive and productive working relations with 
the POTEC. Greater burden-sharing with the new 
chair of the GAC would also lessen the burden on 
POTEC’s modest-sized staff. Having the GAC 
chair present in the European Council would 
further strengthen the links with the sectoral 
Council formations. (Alternatively, there might 
be a half-way solution of a new rule if the GAC 
chair is not the prime minister under which the 
GAC chair would attend the European Council 
meetings and accompany the POTEC and the 
head of the rotating presidency.) A more 
productive partnership between POTEC and an 
empowered GAC chair would be in everyone’s 
interest and would more accurately reflect the 
spirit of the treaties. 
Such an arrangement would also provide an 
important role for the prime minister of the 
rotating presidency, who at present plays 
virtually no role in that capacity. By channelling 
that actor’s energy into the task of bringing 
together the separate strands of POTEC, the 
rotating presidency and the European Council, 
the broken chain of command could be restored 
in a new form.  
The Lisbon Treaty was not the silver bullet that 
some observers had hoped would bring greater 
coordination and unity of purpose among EU 
actors. While there have been many 
improvements, gaps remain, notably between 
POTEC and the various formations of the 
Council. Upgrading the GAC in the two ways 
suggested by this paper should improve the 
situation by repairing the broken chain of 
command and demonstrating the GAC’s 
potential effectiveness in coordinating horizontal 
policy issues.  
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Annex 
GAC in relation to other Council formations and the European Council 
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